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THESIS

POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH
IN THE SOVIET UNION:
ITS THEORY, USE, AND RESULTS

by

JEAN MACINTYRE

JUNE 1993

Thesis Advisor: MIKHAIL TSYPKIN

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93-27967



180

Unclassified

Security Classification of this page

REPORTS DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED		1b. Restrictive Markings	
2a. Security Classification Authority		3. Distribution Availability of Report Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited	
2b. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule		5. Monitoring Organization Report Number(s)	
6a. Name of Performing Organization Naval Postgraduate School	6b. Office Symbol Code 38	7a. Name of Monitoring Organization	
6c. Address (city, state, and ZIP code) Monterey, California 93943-5000		7b. Address (city, state, and ZIP code)	
8a. Name of Funding/ Sponsoring Organization	8b. Office Symbol (If Applicable)	9. Procurement Instrument Identification Number	
8c. Address (city, state, and ZIP code)		10. Source of Funding Numbers	
Program Element Number	Project No.	Task	Work Unit Accession No.
11. Title (Include Security Classification) POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION OF YOUTH IN THE SOVIET UNION: ITS THEORY, USE, AND RESULTS			
12. Personal Author(s) JEAN MACINTYRE, Captain, United States Air Force			
13a. Type of Report MASTER'S THESIS	13b. Time Covered From Jun 91 To Jun 92	14. Date of Report (year, month, day) 1993 June	15. Page count 81
16. Supplementary Notation: The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Dept. of Defense or U.S. government.			
17. Cosatf Codes	Field	Group	Subscript
18. Subject Terms (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) RUSSIA, POLITICAL HISTORY, EDUCATION, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION			
19. Abstract (continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The political socialization of youth in the Soviet Union was recognized by the early Bolsheviks as critical to the future of the new socialist society. Their efforts included plans for Unified Labors schools and compulsory education to develop a literate and politically-aware proletarian force to continue the communist struggle. Later schools and political socialization became a matter of strict Communist Party control from the smallest Octobrist unit to the Young Pioneer <i>zarnitsa</i> camps to the university Komsomol organizations. Despite the vast resources dedicated to <i>vospitaniye</i> and Basic Military Training for youth, these socialization efforts were remarkably unsuccessful in achieving the New Soviet Man. This lack of success in political socialization was clearly demonstrated by numerous factors, among them the many youth resisting the draft prior to the break up of the Soviet Union, the speed of that break up, the emerging ties to the capitalist west, and the lack of faith in the economy. This does not mean that 70 years of life in a communist society did not socialize the youth to some extent. This research suggests that they were more affected by a lack of information about non-communist topics, such as a market economy and democracy, than they were by political socialization from the state.			
20. Distribution/Availability of Abstract unclassified/unlimited same as report DTIC users		21. Abstract Security Classification UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. Name of Responsible Individual Mikhail Tsyphkin		22b. Telephone (Include Area Code) (408) 646-2218	22c. Office Symbol NS

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR

83 APR edition may be used until exhausted

security classification of this page

All other editions are obsolete

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Political Socialization of Youth

in the Soviet Union:

Its Theory, Use, and Results

by

Jean MacIntyre
Captain, United States Air Force
B.S., United States Air Force Academy, 1986

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


from the


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 1993

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ABSTRACT

The political socialization of youth in the Soviet Union was recognized by the early Bolsheviks as critical to the future of the new socialist society. Their efforts included plans for Unified Labor Schools and compulsory education to develop a literate and politically-aware proletarian force to continue the communist struggle. Later schools and political socialization became a matter of strict Communist Party control from the smallest Octobrist unit to the Young Pioneer zarnitsa camps to the university Komsomol organizations. Despite the vast resources dedicated to vospitanie and Basic Military Training for youth, these socialization efforts were remarkably unsuccessful in producing the New Soviet Man. This lack of success in political socialization was clearly demonstrated by numerous factors, among them the many youth resisting the draft prior to the break up of the Soviet Union, the speed of that break up, the emerging ties to the capitalist west, and the lack of faith in the economy. This does not mean that 70 years of life in a communist society did not socialize the youth to some extent. This research suggests that they were more affected by the lack of information about non-communist topics, such as a market economy and democracy, than they were by political socialization from the state.

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Executive Summary

For most Americans, the mere mention of political socialization in the Soviet Union has long evoked images of Young Pioneers laying flowers at Lenin's mausoleum or Pravda headlines about the evils of the capitalist west. However, the truth behind these rituals went much, much deeper. From their cradles, Soviet children were subjected to systematic efforts in political socialization by the state. It is impossible to describe the many different indoctrination efforts that were at work in the Soviet Union. There were probably as many indoctrination techniques as there were people in the Communist Party. Differences were based on resources and priorities, and thus the "universal" program fell far short of its billing. However, political socialization was definitely a priority at some level. For instance, some type of preinduction training and military-patriotic education certainly were part of everyone's life. However, the success of the program is questionable. Obviously, they did not develop Soviet patriotism and a desire to defend the socialist motherland in all young people. The eruption of independence-seeking nations throughout the ex-Soviet republics indicates that they did not achieve internationalism. Apparently, they did not even achieve enough success for these issues to overcome the economic and social realities of life in recent times.

Why this lack of success in vospitanie, or the proper upbringing of youth? There are undoubtedly as many reasons as there are people involved. Reports from the paramilitary DOSAAF organizations (Voluntary Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Fleet) show that interest in military training has dropped considerably. While the numbers of participants often look good on paper, it was usually the same youth who participated in everything, not all youth participating in at least something.

The youth groups faced similar problems. While children eagerly joined the Octobrists, interest dropped off drastically for the Komsomol. There was apparently a cut-off point about the age of fifteen, after which the majority of youth were no longer swayed by the youth groups.

Another factor was the idealism of the youth. Unfortunately for the Communists, they were soon disillusioned. They became aware of the hypocrisy of adult society, and the existence of a facade that was very different from reality. This contradiction, and the hypocrisy with which the authorities faced it, soon undermined and repudiated years of vospitanie.

Glasnost had a significant effect as well. As society became more open about life in general, and about abuses in the Communist Party in particular, the propaganda had increasingly less effect. A similar circumstance was seen with World War II, when the soldiers exposed to the West saw life under capitalism to be different from the way the Communist Party described it. With glasnost, the Soviet public was less and less dependent on government news sources and added the possibility of the widespread exchange of information among Soviets without the effect of government censorship. The more this happened, the more people began to blame the communist system for breeding corruption, in addition to the corrupt officials with whom they had to deal. After years of tolerating small lies, people were openly disillusioned with their government and the Communist Party.

This does not mean, however, that the years of growing up under communism did not socialize the people. The inertia there is tremendous. A country the size of Russia will take years, possible even generations, to complete the change to democracy,

and their communist upbringing can only make this more difficult. However, this research suggests that this background affected the Soviets more by denying them other information than by convincing them that the communists' information was correct. The complete lack of knowledge on market economies, private enterprise, and democratic procedures is a major limiting factor that will affect these people for years to come.

I. INTRODUCTION

For most Americans, the mere mention of political socialization in the Soviet Union has long evoked images of Young Pioneers laying flowers at Lenin's mausoleum, or Pravda headlines about the evils of the capitalist west. However, the truth behind these rituals goes much, much deeper. From their cradles, Soviet children were subjected to systematic efforts in political socialization by the state. That this socialization effort failed to prevent opposition to the coup, or the breakup of the Soviet Union, must have stunned die-hard Communists the world over. Now that the Soviet Union has disbanded and the Communist struggle has been formally dropped, what impact will years of this socialization have on Russia? This paper will investigate the socialization process involved, the extent of its acceptance, and the possible effect it will have on future Russian relations with western nations.

When the Soviet Union began, the Communists were embroiled in World War I, followed by several years of a civil war which threatened not only the success of the revolution but the very existence of the Soviet state. The Communists of the time realized that the proletariat as a political force did not yet exist. Creating such a class became one of their main goals, and was seen as necessary to achieve world communism. They quickly took over what schools

then existed, directing them to produce "the new Soviet man". Debate on the way to accomplish this continued for several years, finally solidifying under Stalin.

This paper will focus on the system under which today's Russian work force and voting population grew up. This was a rigorous system that dictated their training and education from the time they first went to preschool or kindergarten. While the Soviets recognized that there were limits to what such young children could learn, they put a definite emphasis on building the foundations for later learning. The children's experiences here ranged from learning how to get along with others to singing songs of Lenin and the Red Army.

At age seven, the Soviet child joined the school system as a first-grader. Political socialization at this stage was more overt and prevalent in the classroom. It permeated all subjects, in addition to courses dedicated totally to political topics. Also, all students were given an introduction to military training as part of their school curriculum.

The last major element of political socialization in the Soviet Union that will be discussed here is the Communist youth groups. Ranging from the Little Octobrists in elementary school to Young Pioneers to the Komsomol, youth groups for years were the only source of extracurricular activities. This was a powerful motivator for many, who joined simply to take part in summer camps and sports.

The final part of this paper is an examination of the success or failure of their efforts in the area of political socialization. The issue of success or failure

will be analyzed by comparing recent events with their own definition of proper upbringing of youth, or vospitanie. In many ways, the results fell far short of the desired ones, especially considering the amount of resources dedicated to this effort. However, some areas have achieved a significant effect that will last long after the Soviet Union itself.

II. THE BEGINNINGS

A. THE BASIS FOR VOSPITANIE

When the Soviet Union began, more than seventy years ago, the Russian Empire was engrossed in a World War. This inauspicious beginning was followed by several years of a civil war, threatening the success of the revolution and the very existence of the Soviet state, and leading those in charge to the conclusion that they must always be ready to fight. As the "vanguard of the proletariat", the Communist Party immediately saw that they would have to lead the people if they were to achieve communism, controlling society along the desired course of history. The proletarian class, according to Karl Marx, was supposed to accomplish the revolution, not be a product of it. Lenin, however, saw the proletariat as crucial to the Soviet system even after the revolution. An active proletariat was the only way he saw to accomplish the world revolution. Russia, however, had but the merest vestige of a proletarian class. The vast majority of the population consisted of illiterate peasants, the 'Dark People'. Only about 35 percent of the population was literate, and that was defined as being able to write one's own name -- hardly adequate for political activity!¹ An immediate challenge for the new regime was to develop a working class and

¹Joseph I. Zajda, Education in the USSR (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 11.

transform the 'Dark People' into a proletarian force. This required a mass literacy effort and a universal school system which would instill communist values. Lenin has been credited with saying "Give us the child for eight years and it will be a Bolshevik forever."² Education and political socialization were seen as the keys to transforming the peasantry into socialist citizens. With this in mind, the Communist Party immediately set about transforming the mass of the population into the "new Soviet man".

Lenin recognized that the peasantry was thoroughly entrenched in such "bourgeois" values as religion and the ownership of private property. While he used this knowledge to his advantage during the civil war with slogans for peace, land, and bread, he did not give up on communist ideals. Once in power, he was more concerned about maintaining the Bolshevik's position and achieving a communist society. These were long-term goals, and their success was dependent on future generations. That Lenin was aware of this was made clear in his speech at the Third All-Russian Congress of the Russian Young Communist League:

Only by radically remolding the teaching, organization, and training of the youth shall we be able to ensure that the results of the efforts of the younger

²100 Things You Should Know About Communism, prepared for the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, 46-48, (1951), House Document 82-136, quoted in Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested for the Congressional Research Service, ed. Suzy Platt (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1989), 42. Lenin was, however, hardly the first to come up with this concept, and this quotation can be found in several versions from several other sources.

generation will be the creation of a society that will be unlike the old society, i.e., a Communist society.³

Immediately after the revolution, the Soviet education system was organized to accomplish this task. Attention was focussed on the concept of the "new Soviet Man," who would be capable of building socialism, forcibly if necessary. The goal of the Soviet education and youth group system was to create this new Soviet man. This enormous undertaking was to be accomplished through vospitanie. While not directly translatable, this usually entails "moral education and upbringing" or "character training and the development of personality."⁴ Through the years, this goal developed into specific objectives for the education and youth group systems. They were generally broken out into eleven components of vospitanie:

1. Socio-political awareness (to make citizens politically active and literate)
2. Morality and ethics
3. Patriotism and internationalism (to encourage love of the socialist motherland and worldwide proletarian solidarity)
4. Military-patriotic education (to develop the desire to defend the motherland)

³Ken Geiger, "Winning Over the Youth," in Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), 546, reprinted from Lenin: Selected Works, II, (Moscow, 1947), 661.

⁴James Muckle, "The New Soviet Child: Moral Education in Soviet Schools," in The Making of the Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 2.

5. Labor education and professional orientation
6. Mental development and the raising of general culture
7. Atheism
8. Knowledge of the law and obligations of citizens
9. Economic education
10. Aesthetic education
11. Physical education⁵

While many of these elements seem benign, it is important to look behind them to their content to realize the true extent of the socialization intended.

B. THE EARLY YEARS: UNIFIED LABOR SCHOOLS

Since political socialization was so important to the Soviet system, it is not very surprising that a tremendous effort was dedicated to vospitanie in the education system right from the start. The early propositions for the Soviet school were highly ideological, and quite impractical. The first, appearing during the civil war period, was the Unified Labor School, which would provide

nine years of polytechnical education as well as shoes, clothing, hot breakfasts, medical care, and academic materials free of charge to all children regardless of gender or social origin; little or no homework; no standard textbooks, promotion, or graduation examinations or grades; socially useful exercises as part of the standard curriculum; the study and

⁵Muckle, 2.

practice of labor; and self-government for each school in which the public, parents, and pupils would play a vital role.⁶

This plan for Soviet education, however, was economically impossible throughout the entire Soviet period. The early Bolsheviks had no chance to implement the Unified Labor School on a broad scale.

Impervious to the demands of political or fiscal reality, the Commissariat of Enlightenment, responsible for the communist education of youth, next proceeded to develop a curriculum for this school: the complex method. This involved focussing on a series of themes relating to nature, labor, and society, all highly susceptible to political propaganda, rather than specific subjects like reading and writing. This method was largely unsuccessful because both the parents and teachers did not like it, and claimed their children were "going to school but not learning." This period illustrated the conflicting goals of parents and the regime for education, as well as the relative freedom of the day. The conflict was even more pronounced in the countryside, where peasants regarded the complex themes as "Bolshevik mumbo-jumbo."⁷

C. STALIN'S REFORMS

By the late 1920's, the Communists had come to the conclusion that it was necessary to adjust their methods. Clearly the complex method was not

⁶Larry E. Holmes, "Soviet Schools: Policy Pursues Practice, 1921-1928," Slavic Review 48, No. 2 (Summer 1989), 235.

⁷Holmes, 236-241.

producing the skilled workers and active citizens needed for the continuing socialist revolution, but, just as clearly, the Communists were not willing to give up their political goals for education. The resulting compromise brought back the course structure, grades, and discipline of tsarist education while deeply integrating political propaganda.⁸ This compromise occurred at the close of the New Economic Period, mirroring the increasing changes in society. As Joseph Stalin increased the controls on society in general, schools became more controlled, more disciplined. The free-thinking form of education rapidly disappeared, along with an entire school of thought: pedology. These changes included a return to formal examinations, standardized textbooks, and strict classroom discipline.⁹

Reforms were primarily made to improve literacy, math, science, and technical skills in future workers. The curriculum was remarkably similar to the tsarist curriculum, with the noted exceptions of religion, philosophy, and law. Under the Soviets, however, the classical education emphasized in tsarist schools was turned to an emphasis on the sciences and the skills needed to build communism.

Another area of major change during Stalin's era was the nationality issue in education. Russian was made a mandatory subject from the second grade on,

⁸Zajda, 18-19.

⁹Zajda, 22.

"as a necessary means not only of international understanding but of recognition of the heights of the artistic achievements of Russia's writer's, whose works have found world-wide recognition."¹⁰ In the republics acquired after the Second World War, this anti-nationalist view hit an extreme. A description of the changes in Estonia's schools following their annexation says "there was no room in these books for Estonian history, or for that of any people except the Russians."¹¹

D. SUMMARY

The early Soviets recognized the important role of education and socialization in achieving communism in the Soviet Union. The salient points to this education were found in the elements of vospitanie. In addition to more benign emphases, the content of these elements also included preparing the youth for military service and military, economic, and political war against the capitalist West in their struggle for communism. The Communist Party began a literacy campaign and developed their own schools from the very beginning. Despite some early opposition to experimental forms, by the end of the New Economic Period Stalinist controls dominated the Soviet school system.

¹⁰Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion: A History of the Nationalities Problem in the USSR (New York: Free Press, 1989), 186.

¹¹Hermann Rajamaa, The Moulding of Soviet Citizens: A Glance at Soviet Educational Theory and Practice (London: Boreas Publishing, 1948), 28.

III. THE PRE-SCHOOL YEARS

There were two major instruments of political socialization during the Soviet child's pre-school years: the preschool and the family. Suspicious of the influence of older family members, the state would have liked to have been the sole instrument of child rearing in the country, but was physically incapable throughout the entire communist regime. Even for today's generation, only approximately 20 percent of Soviet children attended preschool. The remainder were raised by their mothers or grandmothers until they entered school at age seven.¹² The highest percentages of children attending preschools were found in urban areas, where significantly more attended. From 1945 to 1965, urban enrollment was around 80 percent while rural enrollment varied between 10 to 20 percent. This was based on two factors: the availability of preschools and the willingness of the mothers to put their children in state institutions at very young ages. In the cities, economic conditions frequently required both parents to work, and had removed the nuclear family from the extended family that was often available to raise young children in rural areas. This made urban families more dependent on the state system of child care, and resulted in more urban children

¹²Robert A. Clawson, "Political Socialization of Children in the USSR," in The Political Science Quarterly Vol. 88, No. 4 (December 1973): 703.

receiving their early childhood education in state preschools than rural children.¹³

A. THE PRESCHOOL

Like the rest of the Soviet system, the tenets of preschool education have undergone considerable changes through the years. For the current generation of adults, the Soviets had come to the conclusion that not much of the early childhood political training was understood or absorbed, and therefore it was not worth a considerable investment. Instead, the preschools were supposed to

mold basic character traits, personal attitudes, and habits which lay the correct foundation for later, more overt, political socialization provided by the schools and communist youth groups such as the Octobrists, the Pioneers, and the Komsomols.¹⁴

This did not mean, however, that there were no elements of vospitanie present. Certainly, any preschool would have included activities contributing to physical and aesthetic education, for example. However, these concepts were not the only ones presented to the child.

Among other components of vospitanie, military-patriotic education was a part of a child's experience from the very start. This exposure actually began before school started, in the home and preschools. Preschool children learned patriotic and militant stories and nursery rhymes which probably had no meaning

¹³Clawson, 707.

¹⁴Clawson, 704.

at the time, but became a part of their childhood. By the late 1960s, military toys and games were prominent in stores. Children's books glorified military life at all ages. One of the most extreme examples was one for preschoolers titled "We Pick Up New Rifles" that showed small children being issued rifles and repelling the enemy.¹⁵

Another universally present form of political socialization in the preschools was the presence of Lenin, and for a time Stalin. Every room had a picture of Lenin looking smiling paternally down on the pupils in "Lenin corners." Children heard stories of Lenin's life and sang nursery rhymes on being "Lenin's Grandchildren."

We are not yet Pioneers
We are not yet Octobrists
But we know who we are for sure
We are Lenin's Grandchildren!
We are Lenin's Grandchildren!¹⁶

Other nursery rhymes also followed the Communist theme:

November seventh it is clear
Is the reddest day in all the year
Through the window look ahead
Everything outside is red!¹⁷

¹⁵Scott, 329. The book in question was published by Vladimir Mayakovskiy, Kaliningrad Truth Publishing House, 1970.

¹⁶Kitty Weaver, Russia's Future: The Communist Education of Soviet Youth (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 2.

¹⁷Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer, "A New Soviet Military! The Next Generation," Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs (Spring 1989): 198.

B. THE HOME

At home, mothers were encouraged to "supplement these early efforts by promoting patriotism in their children at home."¹⁸ While harboring no illusions of vast successes in vospitanie in the homes, the state at the very least wanted to curb the undesired influence of "religious and superstitious thought" from old grandmothers and any others who might contaminate the child.¹⁹ The threat of prosecution by the state was undoubtedly a larger factor throughout most of Soviet history than the desire to bring up their children in a socialist mold. Television, another major influence and often used as a babysitter, had war films filling half of the programming. With war becoming a part of his daily life, the child became accustomed to the noise of guns and fighting.²⁰

However, the most important tasks assigned to the family with regards to early childhood vospitanie involved raising the child with a respect for authority, obedience to adults, and self-discipline. The child was to be introduced to the concept of the collective, where "his chief responsibility was not to himself, but rather to those immediately around him." The child was also supposed to be

¹⁸D.T. Yazov, On Guard Over Socialism and Peace (London: BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1988), 121, translated from Yazov's Na Strazhe sotsializma i mira (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), quoted in Nelson and Schwartz.

¹⁹Clawson, 700.

²⁰Victor Hermann and Fred E. Dohrs, Realities: Might and Paradox in Soviet Russia, (Southfield, MI: Independent Publishers, Inc., 1982), 137.

exposed to the "internalization of the work ethic" which would theoretically convince him that he was responsible to the rest of the Soviet people for the work he would or would not do later in life.²¹ However, it is worth noting here that the only aspect of this in which the government was actually involved was receiving the finished product at age seven when she or he reported for the first day of school. This is basically at the very end of Lenin's eight years, which means the home influence for those who did not go to preschool could have already permanently socialized the child in non-Communist values.

C. SUMMARY

Soviet education authorities would have preferred that all children be raised by the state in nurseries and preschools. This would have prevented their "contamination" with non-socialist ideas by mothers and grandmothers in early childhood. However, this was economically infeasible for the Soviet state. The authorities eventually recognized that political themes were too difficult for small children and altered their goals to concentrate on the basic character traits needed for the New Soviet Man, such as respect for authority and self-discipline.

²¹Clawson, 700.

IV. THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

A. VOSPITANIE IN THE SCHOOLS

At age seven, the Soviet child progressed to political socialization in the school system. This was present throughout the child's entire education, and irrespective of his course of study. By the time Soviet schools had stabilized after Stalin's death, courses on Marxism-Leninism and CPSU history took up at least 12-15 percent of the university curriculum, not to mention that of the general education system.²² This applied across the board, regardless of specialty, to ensure that the students continued to be inculcated in the elements of vospitanie. These, and similar social studies courses formed an overt effort at political socialization, obvious even to the students themselves. However, these courses were not the sum total of vospitanie in the schools. Every area considered it, and included it in their studies and activities. For this research, the areas affected by the goals of vospitanie will be considered separately.

B. LITERACY AND LITERATURE COURSES

Literature and literacy courses can have a significant impact on young children, as was realized early in the development of Soviet education. Just as

²²Mervyn Matthews, Soviet Students -- Some Sociological Perspectives," Soviet Studies Vol XXVII (1975): 101.

Americans are familiar with "See Spot Run," Soviet children were thought to ingrain the morals and values portrayed in elementary readers. A primary school reader showed clearly how reading developed into more significant efforts at vospitanie as the child grows older. Children learned to read by "savoring such topics as 'Lenin's Childhood,' 'How Lenin Studied,' 'Lenin and the Red Army,' and so on."²³ One second grade reader included poems on "Lenin's Grandchildren," discussions of holidays, and questions such as "What is a collective?", introducing the students to concepts thought to be important for later life.²⁴ The corresponding third grade reader opens to the Soviet national anthem, portrayed with bright pictures of Soviet accomplishments and the flag. This book includes a chapter on "The Life of Lenin" and sets of questions and assignments on the communist theme. Some examples of these are writing on "The life of children before the revolution" and "Why do the Soviet people mark 7 November as the most important holiday?"²⁵ By the fourth grade reader, all the children pictured were wearing the red scarves of the Pioneers, which would tend to suggest to the reader that they should be, too. This book included one

²³Fred Hiatt, "Moscow School Books Still Glorifying Lenin, Communism," The Sunday Herald (September 8, 1991): 16A, from the Washington Post.

²⁴T.G. Ramzaeva, Russkii Yazik: Uchebnik dla 2 Klassa Chetirexhletne Nachalnoy Shkoli, 4th ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 21, 46, 78-137. The book also has a picture on the cover of a girl wearing her red star and writing "ro-di-na" on the board.

²⁵Rodnoe Slovo: Uchebnik po Chtenyo dla Uchashchuxhletne Nachalnoy Shkoli v Dvuxh Chastyaxh (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 98-9, 132-3, 163.

particularly interesting section entitled "Labor. What a Wonderful Word!"²⁶ The amount of time and energy devoted to learning and repeating these types of simple phrases and stories on Lenin, Communist concepts, and the glory of Communism could not help but socialize the children to some extent.

Rote learning and indoctrination progressed to stories of patriotism and valor during the Great Patriotic War, with tales of exceptional heroism to inspire the students to emulate them. To ensure that the proper message was getting through, the "moral of the story" was often clearly spelled out:

You have read the last page. Together with Trubachov and his friends you have lived through everything that came their way. You love your country as much as they did and if danger comes, you will be ready to defend her from her enemies, to preserve your school, your happy childhood.²⁷

One of the most important elements of vospitanie was military-patriotic education. By the first grades of school, Soviet teachers were "directed to impress upon the young child that each must be prepared for later military activities."²⁸ Eight or ten years of mental preparation for military service were designed to accustom children to the idea of military service. Reading lessons for young children routinely included stories of heroic soldiers and young citizens. Soviet

²⁶T.G. Ramzaeva, Russkii Yazik: Uchebnik dla 4 Klassa Chetirexhletne Nachalnoy Shkoli, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1990), 55.

²⁷Helen Rapp, "Soviet Books for Children," Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston, Ma.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), 444, reprinted from "Noddy and the Commissar: Soviet Children's Literature," Soviet Survey, No. 23 (January-March 1958), 18-23.

²⁸Scott, 329.

elementary readers devote a separate section to "Our Native Army," with stories "highlighting the romance and glamour of military life and presenting the Soviet soldier as a heroic protector of Soviet children."²⁹ Even today, after the demise of the Communist Party, children learn to read by "savoring such topics as 'Lenin's Childhood' or 'Lenin and the Red Army.'"³⁰ Older children read books on the heroism of soldiers, Border Guards, and veterans of the Great Patriotic War. Soviet writers rarely wrote of the hardships and human tragedies behind these heroes.³¹

Literature courses were even more susceptible to political socialization. For much of the time, all literature courses, even those in non-Russian republics, addressed only Russian writers. Any literature that would build national pride was removed. As in other courses, the only subject matter considered to be worth teaching was that which somehow contributed to the overall goal of vospitanie. Anything that actually worked against vospitanie, for example, literature that developed love of a national homeland as opposed to the socialist motherland, was strictly forbidden. Literature also contributed to other elements of vospitanie, and could easily cover most of them. Thus, national writers,

²⁹Jones, 151. See also Felicity Ann O'Dell, Socialization through Children's Literature: The Soviet Example (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978): 76-88, and Charles D. Cary, "martial-patriotic themes in Soviet school textbooks," Soviet Union, vol. 6, pt. 1 (1979): 81-98.

³⁰Fred Hiatt, "Moscow School Books Still Glorifying Lenin, Communism," The Sunday Herald (8 Sep 91): 16A, from the Washington Post.

³¹Hermann and Dohrs, 137.

especially those who were well known before the revolution or who had described anti-Russian or independence efforts, were prohibited. There could not be a "national hero" unless that person could be shown to have striven for the Russian annexation of his homeland. The great national epics, like the Kirghiz Manas, the Uzbek Alpamysh, and the Turkmen Korkut Ata, disappeared from schools and libraries, to be replaced by more "politically correct" literature.³²

C. HISTORY COURSES

History courses faced the same problem as literature courses: anything promoting or describing national pride instead of love of the socialist motherland was mutated or abolished. In addition, the official history had to follow Marx's concept of historical materialism. The history curriculum provided "those who seek to shape the social environment a final opportunity to present their own version of history and its lessons."³³ (underline added) History courses in this way provided distinct opportunities to present and nurture many of the values of vospitanie by proving their efficacy through history. As one Soviet commented on the role of history in the formation of a "communist world view," history enables them to "demonstrate to the pupil the inspiring and organizational role

³²Nahaylo and Swoboda, 103.

³³William B. Husband, "Secondary School History Texts in the U.S.S.R.: Revising the Soviet Past, 1985-1989," in The Russian Review Vol. 50 (October 1991): 459.

of the Communist Party in the revolutionary transformation of the world."³⁴ Accordingly, anything that did not contribute to this demonstration, like the truth behind Stalin's purges and the Great Famine, was not included.³⁵ In even the 1988 version, World War II with its tales of Soviet heroism covers nearly one third of a book from 1941-1986. It also contained information since discredited by glasnost, such as the claim that Finland provoked armed conflict in 1939. The biggest problems occur in the coverage of Stalin.

The question arises: how long will historians call the crimes of Stalin mistakes? He and his underlings committed acts of violence upon our people, and historians refer to these as mistakes! His military crimes are called "miscalculations," his violence against the peasantry "excesses." Things need to be called by their proper names. Call Stalin's actual mistakes "mistakes," call stupidity "stupidity," and call crimes "crimes."³⁶

Even as late as 1988, then, history was being written to accommodate the Communist Party and vospitanie. In addition to hiding unpleasant episodes from the past, the texts often removed anything that did not conform to their concept of history in its march toward Communism. The national republics' histories were immediately suspect in this if they had ever entertained any notion of independence and prosperity without the Soviet Union. After the Great Patriotic War, their histories were rewritten so that "the chief content of their early

³⁴Zajda, 143.

³⁵Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 9.

³⁶Husband, 477.

existence was represented exclusively as a longing for the ultimate joyous fulfillment of their destiny, to be annexed by the Russian Empire."³⁷

History of course was one subject that was easily manipulated to reflect the proper outcome and produce the proper emotions in the students. The history curriculum in the Soviet Union has been described as "teaching a view focussing on the defence of the country - especially Russia - against foreign aggression from the Middle Ages to the Great Patriotic War, and emphasizing the heroism of the Soviet people and the army."³⁸ This was a state-propagated concept; in at least one case, teachers were "reproached for putting too much emphasis on love of peace as the main characteristic of Soviet foreign policy and for neglecting aspects of national security and the need to strengthen its defence position and spirit."³⁹ There was evidently a fine line for Soviet teachers to walk between repeating Soviet rhetoric on peace and producing a desire to fight.

A complicating factor in the achievement of vospitanie through history was that the officially-approved history changed frequently. The older generation now living in the former Soviet Union was taught three different histories: "a new history written by Stalin, extolling his past, present and future; a newer history produced by Khrushchev, changing that of his predecessor -- a de-Stalinized

³⁷Nahaylo and Swoboda, 103.

³⁸Kuebart, 105.

³⁹Kuebart, 109, translated from R.I.Goroshko, and N.A. Shabunovich, "o sostoyanii znaniy i umeniy uchashchikhsya po istorii (IX klass)", Prepodavanie istorii v shkole 1984, No. 2, 49.

history; and now (as of 1982), the newest and 'only true' history is that of Brezhnev."⁴⁰ Today one can also add the "new" versions that appeared under Gorbachev, and those that are appearing as this thesis is being written, each claiming to be more accurate than the others. The resultant confusion undoubtedly had a negative effect on the socialization of children disillusioned by the changes. Teachers have been complaining since 1985 that they were being asked questions they could not answer, especially "why their version of history had changed overnight."⁴¹

As mentioned above, these vast revisions in official history have been encountered before. In 1988, the cancellation of state history exams was merely the culmination of the turmoil among professional historians. The new textbooks had been called for several months earlier by Yegor Ligachev, and glasnost had opened questions on every aspect of Soviet history a year or two before that.⁴² However, this was not the first time: the turmoil after Stalin's death had caused similar problems and the cancellation of university history exams in 1956.⁴³

While glasnost offered freedom to literature and the arts to bring out years of work into the open, historians did not have years of work hidden away to bring out because the state had suppressed both Union-wide data and efforts of

⁴⁰Hermann and Dohr, 8.

⁴¹Ibid., 474.

⁴²Husband, 468.

⁴³Husband, 463.

historians to compile bits and pieces. This, even more than before, left history teachers with huge gaps in their information and no officially approved course of instruction after 1988. This gave the teachers a hitherto unknown freedom to conduct their courses in the manner they saw fit, whether it be to maintain orthodox communist views or read the daily paper for topics.⁴⁴

D. MATH AND SCIENCE COURSES

While the use of social studies and literature courses for political socialization is fairly obvious, subjects such as math and science definitely took a little more thought. In the Soviet Union, however, it became not so much a question of justifying political goals to math and science as justifying math and science to the satisfaction of the political goals and authorities. Since industrial growth required math, science, and technical skills in the workers, it is not surprising that this justification was quickly established.

These subjects could fairly easily cover elements such as labor education and professional orientation, often with almost no manipulation. Others were more difficult, but accomplished. One chemistry syllabus gave "pride of place to the beneficial moral and ideological effect of studying chemistry: the subject is said to arm pupils with the knowledge and skills necessary for active participation in the communist construction, and to contribute to the formation of a dialectical-

⁴⁴Ibid., 470.

materialist world-view and atheistic convictions."⁴⁵ Every subject could be related to at least one, if not several, elements of vospitanie. Atheism, for instance, was covered with Darwinism in biology, and love of the socialist motherland was developed by emphasizing Soviet scientists with international accomplishments and reputations (while obviously avoiding such negative examples from their past as Lysenko).

Mathematics fell victim to the same process. A disgruntled math teacher wrote to the magazine Ogonek in recent years complaining about the way school textbooks were used to "subject young minds to a thorough ideological working over." He gave a page of satirical examples. Here are two which would shock any American parent:

There are 300 Pioneers in the Pavlik Morozov pioneer detachment. They all dream of repeating Pavlik's heroic deed (he shopped both his parents to the NKVD), but not all will have the chance since two-thirds of them are being brought up by single mothers. How many pioneers will be able to repeat Pavlik's heroic deed?

At a closed party meeting at a tractor factory, the party organiser told communists that a shop three kilometres from the factory had received a supply of vodka. The communists rushed out of the factory and ran to the shop at a speed of 20 kph. Five minutes later, non-party workers learnt of the vodka delivery and ran to the shop at a speed of 40 kph. Who will get the vodka first: communists or non-party workers?⁴⁶

⁴⁵Muckle, 5.

⁴⁶"New Maths," Soviet Analysis: A Fortnightly Commentary vol. 20, No. 6 (14 August 1991): 7-8.

The socializing impact of problems like these, repeated throughout a child's education, can clearly be seen. While the first is openly aggressive, the second has a hidden lesson as well: the communists got the vodka even though the non-party workers worked twice as hard (ran twice as fast) to get there. It is also interesting to note that what they were all rushing out to get was alcohol, something most parents would not want their elementary school children to want even if the parents drank it themselves.

E. LABOR EDUCATION

Another crucial element of vospitanie was labor education. A desired part of the Soviet curriculum clear back to the Unified Labor School, the issue of productive labor in Soviet education continued to be emphasized into the 1990s. Newspaper articles on education inevitably included an exhortation that children be taught the significance of their participation in the society, that "without his concrete contribution to the common cause, something will not be constructed, sown, or harvested."⁴⁷

This element was worked into the child's education in two ways, both indirectly and directly. Some indirect methods have been pointed out above in other subject areas, such as the question in the reader "What is a collective?". There were direct lessons as well. Called "labor lessons," children had them

⁴⁷"Educating the Citizen," Izvestia (20 August 1980), 1, translated in FBIS (30 September 1980), S9.

regularly as part of the curriculum throughout their educational career. These were often organized with the help of a local factory or farm, which sponsored the class and hopefully supplied the students with obsolete materials and role models for their studies. The children, for their part, were expected to produce something socially useful, such as in simple projects or by tending small gardens.⁴⁸ These labor lessons produced some labor skills in the students, but, more importantly, they were supposed to cultivate good work habits and a sense of belonging to a working collective.

F. HOLIDAYS AND FIELD TRIPS

Another area subjected to mass socialization in schools was the children's participation in holidays and field trips. Soviet children took part in holiday celebrations as actively as American children. The key difference is that holidays were dictated by the state, and the only ones permitted contributed somehow to political socialization. Religious holidays such as Christmas and Easter were replaced with politically correct holidays such as New Year's and Lenin's Birthday.⁴⁹

⁴⁸Felicity O'Dell, "Forming Socialist Attitudes Toward Work Among Soviet Schoolchildren," in The Making of the Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 86.

⁴⁹John Dunstan, "Atheistic Education in the USSR," in The Making of the Soviet Citizen, ed. George Avis (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 67.

Some of these were specifically designed to inculcate the proper attitudes and advance the children's military-patriotic education. One method was to familiarize children with wartime activities that took place in their area. Many schools developed "museums of combat glory" with their Pioneer and Komsomol detachments. Assignments included maintaining war memorials, corresponding with units that liberated their area during the Great Patriotic War, or research into the units from the local area.⁵⁰ Children visited army posts, "adopted" and were "adopted" by military units, went to war memorials, and did many other things leading to political socialization. The reported numbers involved are huge. In one report, 200,000 children from 815 schools in the Urals district visited army posts in 1969 alone. In addition, millions of children went on pilgrimages to innumerable war monuments and shrines. They stood "before symbols of death and victory, meditated on the sacrifice of those who fell, and dedicated themselves with fervor to serving the Soviet fatherland."⁵¹

Also, the Soviet Union had an inordinate number of holidays celebrating the Armed Forces, all of which were given much attention in the schools. These include Navy Day, Army Day, Rocket Forces Day, Air Force Day, Tank Day, Militia Day, Recruit Day, and Victory Day, in addition to local memorials of

⁵⁰Jones, 152.

⁵¹Robert G. Wesson, "The Military in Soviet Society," in The Russian Review Vol. 30 No. 2 (April 1971): 139-140.

specific events.⁵² In the late 1980s, for instance, a Soviet admiral described being "thrilled" by a "grandiose celebration dedicated to the 175th anniversary of the famous battle of Borodino."

Many thousands of people went out that day to the field which has become a symbol of national glory and valor, a majestic monument of two patriotic wars. Thanks to television and radio, our whole country became, in essence, a participant in this vivid patriotic occasion.⁵³

This seems a bit extreme. How could a battle , especially one considered a Russian loss by the rest of the world and fought a hundred years before the Soviet Union existed, be a "symbol of national glory" for the whole Soviet Union? This celebration strongly implies that the Soviets were willing to celebrate any military event simply for the propaganda effect, and reflects the Russo-centric attitude that pervaded these socialization efforts throughout the union.

G. SUMMARY

Political socialization in the schools was a constant factor throughout a Soviet child's education. It covered the entire range from short stories in elementary readers to comprehensive courses on Marxism-Leninism in universities. All subjects were required to justify their existence by contributing to vospitanie. Some, such as labor education, were included in the schools solely

⁵²Wesson, 143.

⁵³Sorokin, 51.

for this purpose. Even extra-curricular activities were officially geared to the elements of vospitanie, even if only physical education.

V. MILITARY TRAINING IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM

Another aspect of this socialization was military-patriotic education and military training. This effort engulfed vast resources and amazing programs to predispose Soviet youth to military service and develop a desire to defend the motherland. While all aspects of vospitanie were considered important by the Soviet regime, some had significantly more time and resources directed towards them. One such element was the military-patriotic education of Soviet youth, both in the school systems and in extracurricular activities. Military-patriotic education was an integral part of the Soviet school system, the point of which was to "influence the feelings, will, mind and physical development of pupils in order to teach them the attitudes and knowledge necessary for defending their homeland and the other countries of the socialist community and for providing international assistance to young developing countries in their struggle against the reactionary forces of imperialism."⁵⁴ There were undoubtedly many reasons behind the prominence of military-patriotic education in the Soviet Union. However, one reason was pre-eminent: the Communist Party put this element high on the priority list, and that was sufficient to ensure its continued emphasis in the lives of Soviet youth.

⁵⁴Friedrich Kuebart, "The Political Socialization of Schoolchildren," in Soviet Youth Culture, ed. Jim Riordan (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 105.

The defense of the 'socialist fatherland' was routinely stated as one of the 'most important functions' of the state in the Party Program for years, and the question of the "military-patriotic education of young people, their preparation for service in the Army and Navy, and the development in them of a clear understanding of their civic and military duty" was usually considered an important part of this defense.⁵⁵ The military-patriotic education of youths became even more important after the 1967 Law on Universal Military Obligation reduced the period of military service for draftees. This law also made mandatory a preinduction Basic Military Training program (NVP) for boys.⁵⁶ This training added a specific curriculum to the base of socialization provided by years of participation in the school system and the youth groups.

The average Soviet youth faced more than 140 hours of instruction in the "art of war". More than 50,000 military instructors were employed by the Ministries of Education and Defense to teach children the "deadly skills of shooting, grenade throwing, and military tactics."⁵⁷ It was thoroughly integrated in all grades, at skill levels appropriate to the ages involved. In addition, "normal" academic subjects included messages building military-patriotic

⁵⁵Admiral A. Sorokin, "An Assignment from the Party and the People," Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov No. 10, 1987, 27-34, translation in JPRS-UMA-88-004 (29 Feb 88) "Admiral Surveys Initial Training Pluses and Minuses," 49.

⁵⁶Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1984), 333.

⁵⁷Ronald R. Nelson and Peter Schweizer, "A New Soviet Military? The Next Generation," in Orbis (Spring 1989), 197.

education. Some analysts describe the lessons taught in Soviet schools as "belligerently militaristic, not peaceful or historical", saying they celebrate victory, rather than the cessation of fighting.⁵⁸ This is a subtle but important distinction.

A. BASIC MILITARY TRAINING

The preceding pages have described in brief the various methods used by the school system to indirectly socialize Soviet youth in the elements of vospitanie. The schools, however, did not stop there. After the 1967 Law on Universal Military Service, schools were required to provide 140 hours of Basic Military Training (NVP), plus an additional 30 hours during summer camp.⁵⁹ In addition to the military training, this program was designed to supplement and reinforce the socialization towards patriotism and respect for the armed forces begun in the earlier years.⁶⁰ It was intended to teach the following:

1. Knowledge of Soviet defence policies and the global political situation influencing them, as well as of their ideological premises and the role allotted to the Soviet Armed Forces.
2. Pride in the Soviet homeland, its economic and cultural achievements and popular heroism, notions which are to arouse a willingness to continue this work.

⁵⁸Nelson and Schwartz, 199.

⁵⁹Scott, 334.

⁶⁰Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military, (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 63-64.

3. Political-ideological vigilance and willingness to defend communist ideals actively, hatred of the imperialist class enemy.
4. Mental and physical preparedness to do military service in the Armed Forces and, in particular, a willingness to take up the career of a serving soldier.⁶¹

This program was mandatory, even for those who had graduated from an eight-year school and were already in the work force. In addition to the school system, all technical colleges, factories, plants, and other places of work were also responsible for providing this training as part of their job training. These teenagers were usually taught in DOSAAF facilities attached to the workplace. The shift to ten-year schools made this program much easier, as the vast majority of students were then covered by the schools and easily tracked. Reportedly, most youngsters who went through the senior years of school from the late 1970s on have been through the military course.⁶²

The program was to be taught by military instructors, preferably reserve officers with some training in education. However, most schools were unable to employ someone with this training, especially in remote areas. In the late 1970s, the Ministry of Education complained that one-third of the military instructors were reserve sergeants and soldiers and some had only a high school diploma

⁶¹Kuebart, 108, translated from A.M. Katukov and E.N. Tsvetaev, Voenno-patrioticheskoe vospitanie uchashchikhsya na zanyatiyakh po nachalnoi voennoi podgotivke (Moscow: Mysl, 1983), 5.

⁶²Jones, 65.

and two years of military service as a conscript. This was considered a serious problem, and the state's reaction demonstrated their commitment to military-patriotic education. The Ministry of Defense established short courses to make these instructors reserve officers and the Ministry of Education established short courses to certify them with teacher training. In addition, the long-term solution led to the establishment of actual programs in pedagogical institutes to train military instructors for this program in the school systems by the Ministries of Education and Defense.⁶³

The course of instruction for NVP was not designed so much to achieve actual military skills as to insure that every student was introduced to them, with the assumption that they would then be more receptive to them during their military service. In this light, it is worth examining the content of this course. During it, students were introduced to military regulations and lifestyles, small-caliber rifles, target practice and grenade throwing.

⁶³Jones, 65.

Typical NVP Course Plan⁶⁴

Grade	9	9	10	10
Subject	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Introduction	1	1	-	-
Weapons Training	20	13	6	6
Tactical Training	4	4	6	-
Drill Training	7	-	4	-
Military topography	-	-	2	-
Military Medical Training	2	-	-	-
Civil Defense	29	29	-	-
Military Technical Training	-	-	35	35
First aid	-	16	-	19
Armed Forces Defense	4	4	7	7
Armed Forces Regulations	3	3	7	7

⁶⁴Jones, 66, adapted from Uchebno-metodicheskoye posobiye po nachal'noy voyennoy podgotovke (Moscow: Prosvesshcheniye, 1981), 227-228. Various articles in Uchitelskaya Gazeta gave slightly different numbers for specific elements, but the total was always given as 140 hours.

Grade	9	9	10	10
Subject	Boys	Girls	Boys	Girls
Examination	-	-	3	3
Total	70	70	70	70

Of course, this instruction placed a major burden on the school. Older children actually learned to fire live ammunition, and could learn parachuting, radio operations, martial arts, and more, all through the Soviet school system. Physical education classes included these and other skills in addition to sports and exercises. As noted above, however, the socialization value of this program was considered to be much higher than the military value, even though it was nominally instituted to replace lost service time.

These classes also provided the basis for a child to earn his or her GTO, "Ready for Labor and Defense." This program awarded certificates to children and adults by age groups, starting at age ten. The requirements progressed as the child grew older, but they were all designed to develop the physical skills and at least an awareness of the knowledge that might be needed to defend the motherland.

The Basic Military Training was obviously an ambitious program for Soviet schools to take up, and required resources not normally associated with a school.

The Ministry of Defense's Directory of External Military Training approved the guidelines for these facilities in 1977. The ideal one included a military office, classrooms, weapons storeroom, firing range, drill field, obstacle course, sentry post, and an antiradiation shelter.⁶⁵ In addition, the school should have had a civil defense classroom which also served as an antiradiation shelter, with a "room for the head of the civil-defense headquarters, a room for the commandant, a special room with all the equipment for the formation, for medical service, special fire-fighting equipment, tables for each grade, drinking water, and a special table for determining the sizes of the means of personal protection."⁶⁶

However, with the perpetual economic problems of the Soviet Union, it should be no surprise that many schools never acquired these facilities, much less the equipment for them. Tellingly, there were more news articles on the lack of these facilities than their presence. For example, three years after the new law went into effect, one oblast was short 103 target ranges, 121 tactical and civil defense training systems, 147 obstacle courses, 66 sports facilities, and "many other elements."⁶⁷ This problem was supposed to have been taken care of by rotating students from deficient schools through facilities at other schools in the area. Nor was this a problem limited to remote areas: in Moscow, 43 percent of

⁶⁵Jones, 66.

⁶⁶Nelson and Schweizer, 199.

⁶⁷G. Chernyshev, "Changes Would be More Noticeable," Voyenniye Znaniye No. 2 (Feb 89): 8-9, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-014, "Lack of Facilities Noted," (3 Jun 89): 46.

schools lacked gymnastic facilities and 60 percent did not have obstacle courses.⁶⁸ In addition, there were less than 16 percent of the NVP training facilities required for the number of students in Moscow in 1989.⁶⁹ This lack undoubtedly affected the training of the students going through the program.

B. CIVIL DEFENSE

As mentioned above, in addition to the social studies classes and efforts to improve vospitanie within standard classes, the Soviets included classes specifically geared to vospitanie in their curriculum. These were those devoted to civil defense and military training. These mainly served to accomplish the military-patriotic education and develop patriotism, but also supported other elements such as physical education and socio-political awareness. Civil defense training showed up in a child's education well before the military training. However, in the last two years of school, civil defense came under the purview of Basic Military Training.

The child was introduced to civil defense training by the third grade. This training was to teach the child protect him- or herself "against weapons of mass destruction," "resolutely exposing the aggressive essence of imperialism" and

⁶⁸Col Res F. Semyanovskiy, "Conscript from Moscow. How He Is Prepared for Military Service," Krasnaya Zvezda (29 Apr 89): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-012, "Moscow Area Given Low Marks for Pre-Draft Training," (22 May 89): 29.

⁶⁹Lt Col G. Petrenko, Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil No. 5 (Mar 89): 39-46, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011, "Leaders of Moscow Commissariat Detail State of Pre-Draft Training," (15 May 89): 67.

introducing to the child's mind the "sinister prospects of nuclear war caused by international imperialism". From the third to eighth grades, children spent 35 hours a year learning how to protect themselves from chemical and nuclear weapons. In the last two grades, civil defense was included in Basic Military Training.⁷⁰

The instruction on civil defense was amazingly in depth. The Elementary Military Training textbook from 1979 went into considerable detail on the effects of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, especially on the human body, based on Soviet experiments. It also gave a "second-by-second account of the damage caused by a nuclear explosion to buildings and people." This textbook included some extremely unrealistic instructions to the students in case of a nuclear attack:

Having noticed the flash of a nuclear explosion you must quickly lie face down with feet toward the explosion, availing yourself of any nearby dips and of protection. In this way it is possible to reduce the likelihood of being hit by the shock wave and even completely void it. In addition, you should turn up your greatcoat collar and protect your hands under yourself; to avoid losing your sight, cover the face well. Immediately after the shock wave passes you must at once get up and continue to carry out your military mission.⁷¹

⁷⁰Nelson and Schweizer, 201.

⁷¹"Bringing Up Ivan: Military Training (2)," Soviet Analysis Vol. 11 No. 6 (24 Mar 82): 5.

It would have been very interesting to watch the Soviet students that read between the lines and realized that the shock wave was not the only destructive effect of a nuclear weapon! Recently, in 1988, a directive of the USSR State Committee of People's Education, the USSR Chief of Civil Defense, the USSR Health Ministry, and the Union of the Red Cross and Red Crescent mandated several changes in the civil defense program for students. A major change was that, for the first time, civil defense was applied to peacetime. It then addressed actions to protect themselves and others during natural disasters, accidents and similar events.⁷²

C. SUMMARY

Military-patriotic education was a high priority in the Soviet Union. In addition to Basic Military Training, it kept alive the memory of fallen comrades and urged children to view them as heroes to emulate. Their methods involved all aspects of a young person's structured life: school, extra-curricular activities, and youth groups. Both military-patriotic education and Basic Military Training were designed to promote "patriotism and respect for the armed forces" and conditioning young men to accept military service as the only honorable course.

⁷²Civil Defense Department, "New Programs," Voyennyye Znaniya (Mar 89): 36, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-012, "New Training Programs in Schools," (22 May 89): 58.

VI. YOUTH GROUPS

The second major source of vospitanie for Soviet youth was the youth group appropriate to the child's age. These groups were the Little Octobrists, ages seven to ten; the Young Pioneers, ages ten to fifteen; and the Komsomol, ages fourteen to twenty six.⁷³ Set up in conjunction with the schools, and supported by them, these groups were not administered under the school hierarchy, but under the aegis of the Communist Party. These youth groups were almost exclusively dedicated to the goals of vospitanie.

A. THE LITTLE OCTOBRISTS

The first of these the child encountered were the Little Octobrists. All children were expected to be Little Octobrists, which is where the child began his "education in civic responsibility."⁷⁴ Their first introduction to this education were the Rules of the Octobrists:

- An Octobrist is a future Pioneer.
- An Octobrist is a diligent child, loves school, and respects his elders.

⁷³Kitty Weaver, Russia's Future: The Communist Education of Soviet Youth (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 5.

⁷⁴Merle Fainsod, "The Komsomol: Youth Under Dictatorship," in Soviet Society: A Book of Readings, ed. Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger, (Boston, Ma.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), 155, reprinted from "The Komsomols: A Study of Youth Under Dictatorship," American Political Science Review, Vol. 45 (1951), 18-40.

- Only those who love work are called Octobrists.
- An Octobrist is truthful and brave, dextrous and smart.
- An Octobrist is a friendly child, reads and draws, plays and sings, lives a merry life.⁷⁵

These rules fit the Soviet scheme of political socialization for children very well. They were directed toward building the basic values need for future vospitanie: self-discipline, respect for authority, and love of work.

Octobrist groups were formed in all schools, usually by grade and class. Schools activities were supported by them, as well as supporting them. For instance, the Octobrists were encouraged to handle simple discipline problems among themselves, and encouraged the children to study hard. For their part, the schools supported the Octobrists by providing classrooms and materials, encouraging the view that everyone should join, and helped promote the same values. Readers frequently included questions like "What is the meaning of the Octobrists?" and "What obligations do you owe the red star, and how do you fulfill these obligations?"⁷⁶ These Octobrist groups also took the lead in preparing for Soviet holidays, visiting war memorials, and other extracurricular socializing activities.

⁷⁵Weaver, 5.

⁷⁶Weaver, 9.

B. THE YOUNG PIONEERS

This education continued in the Young Pioneers. The Pioneers were also organized through the schools, by grade and class. Each school was supposed to have a paid senior Pioneer leader who had completed a special pedagogical institute. There were over a hundred such schools for training these leaders, as well as a correspondence course.⁷⁷

The Pioneer Laws reflected the older age of Pioneers, as well as a higher degree of political socialization.

- The Pioneer is true to the working class.
- The Pioneer is a friend and brother to every Pioneer and Komsomol.
- The Pioneer is honest and thruthful. His word is like granite.
- The Pioneer is disciplined.
- The Pioneer daily helps his fellow workers to build a Communist society.
- The Pioneer loves work and respects useful labor.
- The Pioneer is pure in thought, word, and deed.⁷⁸

The Pioneer handbook, Tovarishch, definitely included obvious elements of vospitanie, providing young people a detailed explanation of the roles and missions of the five Soviet military services, as well as the Border Guards and

⁷⁷Weaver, 77.

⁷⁸Weaver, 48.

Internal Troops, and pictures of military equipment, ranks, and insignia.⁷⁹ Their slogan, part of the initiation ceremony, was "To battle for Lenin and Stalin --be ready!" with the new Pioneers answering with the slogan on their badge "Always ready!"⁸⁰

Among the many activities they provided for Pioneers were the Zarnitsa, or "summer lightning" games. The greatest achievement of the Zarnitsa program was considered to be the "development of a strong and positive attitude toward the security of the country and a continuing consciousness of the need to be prepared to defend the Soviet homeland against all enemies."⁸¹ Started in 1967, these took place at Pioneer camps during school vacations and were competitive war games for Soviet youth. In 1983, more than fifteen million children took part in these wargames in "battalions" almost exactly replicating those in the Soviet Armed Forces.⁸² The teams were opposing forces who usually fought to capture the other team's flag. The teams were originally the "Reds" and the "Whites"; however, since the "Whites" sometimes won and the "Reds" could lose (a horrendous concept to a properly-brought-up young Communist!) they changed the colors to blue and white. The finals were nationwide, and very similar to military exercises. They included generals as advisors, and aircraft, tanks and live

⁷⁹Scott, 331.

⁸⁰Fainsod, 155. Stalin was removed from the slogan in 1956.

⁸¹Hermann and Dohrs, 134-135.

⁸²Scott, 331.

ammunition for added realism. Other games focused on more current (1940s and 1950s) enemies and were similarly realistic, like "Catch the Spies" which included mock trials and executions.⁸³

C. THE KOMSOMOL

Zarnitsa was so successful for the Pioneers that the Komsomol version, Orlenok, was introduced in 1972.⁸⁴ Since the "first obligation of the Komsomol was to prepare himself for service in the Soviet Army," these games fit right in the program.⁸⁵ They included live firings, competitions, marches, and tactical games, all "designed to prepare the youth for military service and to contribute to the premilitary training program."⁸⁶ More than 35 million young people attended these camps annually.⁸⁷ In addition, Komsomol members were much of the staff of the Pioneer camps and zarnitsa games.

D. DOSAAF

Another source of extra-curricular military-patriotic education for youth was the paramilitary organization DOSAAF (Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force, and Fleet). DOSAAF units provided teens and adults the

⁸³Hermann and Dohrs, 140.

⁸⁴ Scott and Scott, 331.

⁸⁵Fainsod, 159.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Nelson and Schweizer, 203.

opportunity to learn more advanced military skills. Membership was open to any Soviet citizen age 14 and older. Their activities included: "military-patriotic education of workers and young students; preparing lads for actual military service in the USSR Armed Forces; training cadres of mass technical occupations having military-related importance for the national economy; assisting in civil defense measures; developing technical and applied military sports in the country; strengthening the material and technical base."⁸⁸ In the late 1980s, DOSAAF had attracted over 100 million members, and had resources including 39,000 motor vehicles, 20,000 carts, 52,000 amateur radios, and about 7,000 aircraft. DOSAAF routinely claimed to have trained about one-third of the draftees in military specialties.⁸⁹ However, some DOSAAF training was apparently mandatory, which would make the membership levels less impressive. Communist Party, trade union, economic, and especially Komsomol organizations were required to assist DOSAAF in its efforts to properly socialize and train the younger generation.⁹⁰ DOSAAF also often ran the NVP programs for young men who had left school before finishing, and worked with the Party to run the summer

⁸⁸"USSR DOSAAF Regulation," Voyennoye Znaniya No. 3 (Mar 89): 21-24, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011, "Changes in DOSAAF Regulation Detailed" (15 May 89): 56-57.

⁸⁹"Roundtable of DOSAAF Candidates for People's Deputies," Krasnaya Zvezda (12 Mar 89): 1-2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-011 (15 May 89): 73.

⁹⁰Robert G. Wesson, "The Military in Soviet Society," in The Russian Review Vol. 30 No. 2 (April 1971): 140.

Zarnitsa and Orlenok camps. In addition, DOSAAF had camps and schools of its own, training young people in one of 40 military specialties.⁹¹

Finally, if these organizations were not enough, there were several thousand military-patriotic associations or clubs available to youth interested in more military-patriotic education. By mid-1990, there were almost 4,000 of these "unofficial" clubs in the Soviet Union. A statute apparently put these clubs under the Komsomol, but they went beyond the Komsomol bureaucracy almost immediately. These clubs were usually led by men recently released from active duty.⁹² The most sinister of these was the "Young Friends of the Border Guards." They actually played games with Border Guards and dogs following a "frontier transgressor" and arresting him!⁹³ Others included the "Young Friends of the Soviet Army" and the more benign "Red Scouts," a group that tried to protect historical evidence of battles from the civil war and the Great Patriotic War⁹⁴. These groups were still being formed in the last few years. For example, an All-Union Naval Youth League was created in 1990. The goal of this organization was to "teach a new generation about the best traditions of the Soviet

⁹¹Jones, 69.

⁹²Col O. Sholmov, "'How Much Can Enthusiasm be Exploited?' or 'How To Help the Military-Patriotic Clubs?'" Krasnaya Zvezda (25 Apr 90): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-90-013, "Growth of Military-Patriotic Clubs, Associations" (4 Jun 90): 90.

⁹³Nelson and Schweizer, 203, from Riga Domestic Service (24 May 17) translated in BBC: SOV (1 Sep 87).

⁹⁴Kuebart, 106.

Navy, to teach young people about the rudiments of the sailor's trade, and to prepare them for service in the Navy."⁹⁵

E. SUMMARY

The youth groups were designed to include young people in the struggle to achieve communism. The three levels were split by age groups, and became more selective as they grew. The Octobrists and Young Pioneers were universal socializing groups; the Komsomols were the training ground for future Party members. Youth group activities worked with the schools to attract children to communism. DOSAAF, which was geared to older youth and adults, focussed on military, patriotic and civil defense activities and training.

⁹⁵Sr Lt A. Kryshnal, "For You Who Love the Sea," Krasnaya Zvezda (26 Apr 90): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-90-021, "All-Union Naval Youth League Created" (20 Sep 90): 80.

VII. SUCCESS?

The overall goal of all this was, of course, the proper upbringing of the next generation to carry on the communist revolution and the Soviet Union. Prior to the fall of 1991, many people thought the Soviets were successful in this effort. One such person was Victor Hermann, an American who had lived there as a Soviet citizen for most of his life. In 1982, after returning to the United States, he wrote:

The vast majority of Soviet peoples, however, do function as Man Machines today -- as their parents and grandparents functioned since the time of Lenin -- whether they realize it or not. Effective conditioning by the rules of the Kremlin limits the people's perception of the realities of their own lives so much that Man Machines is a valid conception and description.⁹⁶

Years earlier, the U.S. Congress and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare thought this socialization potent enough to represent a threat to the United States, and funded several reports on Soviet education.⁹⁷ Today, however, this is no longer an obvious, or even reasonable, conclusion.

With the increasing impact of glasnost, people outside the Soviet Union have been questioning the effectiveness of the years of socialization. It is difficult, if

⁹⁶Hermann, 9.

⁹⁷Several reports are available, from Education in the USSR, from the US Dept of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bulletin 1957, No. 14 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1957) to "Report on Russia By Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN," Hearing before the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959).

not impossible, to determine the effectiveness of vospitanie a generation or two ago because the strict enforcement of Soviet law did not allow for the expression of personal opinions that could have shown any failures. Today it is still difficult, if not impossible, to determine the success of vospitanie in a population as large and varied as the former Soviet Union. Sociology as a science left much to be desired in that country, due in large part to political repression throughout much of its history. With the advent of Gorbachev and glasnost on the political scene, however, polls have become more widespread and accepted. Two Soviet sociological institutions, the Institute of Sociology and the Center of Public Opinion Studies, began conducting polls on politically sensitive issues early in Gorbachev's regime.⁹⁸ The lack of expertise and resources, however, makes most of these opinion polls somewhat less than trustworthy as scientific evidence. They are blatantly inadequate to judge the success of vospitanie because they invariably focus on small parts that cannot even pretend to be representative of all the peoples of the former Soviet Union. In addition, polls are not available on many of the elements of vospitanie. With this in mind, this report includes other, equally unscientific, data in the hope of broadening the picture.

Today, it is obvious that the Communists did not completely succeed in their efforts at vospitanie, since the Soviet Union and the Soviet Communist Party ceased to exist as a political entity in the end of 1991. However, some important

⁹⁸Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Glasnost and Polling," The Christian Science Monitor, 2 November 1989, 19.

elements of vospitanie may have had a significant impact in spite of the noted lack of success with overall results. The issue now is how many elements, and which ones, may have successfully socialized large portions of the population in a way that has the potential to impact their interactions in the international arena. Those elements that have been directed toward international issues in the history of the Soviet Union seem to have the the largest potential to do so in the future. They are: socio-political education, patriotic-international education, military-patriotic education, labor/economic education. To attempt to determine the extent of any success, this paper will examine various indicators for each element separately.

A. SOCIO-POLITICAL EDUCATION

This is one element that can easily be seen as an ironic partial success. Designed to "make citizens politically active and literate," they definitely succeeded in doing so, although with somewhat different results than may have been anticipated. The people participating in Moscow in the summer of 1991 were politically aware and active in fighting against a coup that would have brought back communism. However, that was a very small percentage of the population. For the most part, the rest of the city, not to mention the country, went on with their daily lives, hardly sparing a second glance at the commotion and definitely not giving up their place in line for it. Those politically active and aware on communism's side appeared in equally small numbers. Now that the

Communist Party is no longer in control of their careers, few seem to care. The attempt by some to revive the old Soviet parliament in the "Extraordinary Sixth Congress of the People's Deputies of the U.S.S.R." in March is one example: only 217 (of 2,250) delegates elected under communism showed up."⁹

B. PATRIOTIC-INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

The major indicator here is rising nationalism. While Soviet patriotism was prevalent in ethnic Russians, for their motherland, it was widely lacking in other ethnic groups feeling no bond to Mother Russia. Its failure in the non-Russian areas became blatantly obvious with the tenacity with which nationalities within the Soviet Union pushed for independence. Even areas with a high concentration of ethnic Russians, such as eastern Ukraine, voted to separate based on economic issues, evidencing a lack of patriotism to the motherland.

This is not entirely surprising since the vast majority of Soviet patriotic education was based on Russian heroes and Russian nationalism, and the nationalities were frequently persecuted by the Soviets. This left the various nationalities feeling that their national existence was threatened by the Soviets, not protected by them as their rhetoric claimed. In addition, the Soviets, and the Russians before them, did not have a wonderful legacy in the area of managing non-Russian territories that would induce them to remain loyal to Moscow.

⁹Serge Schmemmann, "Soviet Die-Hards Fume By Candlelight," The New York Times, 18 March 1992, A3.

C. MILITARY-PATRIOTIC EDUCATION

The military-patriotic education of the next generation of Soviets swallowed up untold resources throughout the years. Whether or not their efforts actually achieved this goal is another issue. During the final years of the Soviet Union, various factors seemed to indicate that this attempt at socialization was falling apart. This section will investigate three. The first is the increasing number of young people and their parents who would prefer to serve in national forces, rather than the Soviet forces defending the Soviet Union as a whole, much less other socialist states. The second is the increasing number of draft dodgers and deserters during this period, which indicates a failure to convince young people of the necessity of military service at all costs. The third significant indication of the failure of military-patriotic education was the training status of draftees at the time of their induction.

First, rising nationalism had been a growing problem in the Soviet Union for years. This is a topic well beyond the scope of this study. Pertinent here, however, is nationalism's effect on Soviet patriotism. Patriotism, to the Soviet Union, was an obvious element of vospitanie, but apparently not particularly well thought out in its implementation. A desire to serve in one's own republic, or even in a military of that republic, had been growing for several years prior to the break-up of the union. This was clearly seen in a 1990 survey of preinductees in Georgia and Tajikistan. The survey showed a "substantial number who had a positive attitude toward the creation of ethnic military formations and expressed

a desire to perform their military service solely within their own republics."¹⁰⁰ This was an indication that patriotism to the Soviet Union had not been successfully inculcated in the youth, not to mention a failure in the "clarification of the constitutional duties of each Soviet citizen in regard to the defense of the socialist fatherland."¹⁰¹ An investigation in the early 1980s showed that the vast quantity of military-patriotic education had

not succeeded in giving all pupils a clear idea of Soviet defence policies. The ideological foundations of military policies and Lenin's statements on the country's defence apparently remained too abstract for many pupils and failed to have a motivating effect on their attitudes to military service; they did not seem to view the world's military situation as so threatening as to make them take a particular interest in it.¹⁰²

Recently, another aspect of this issue arose. With the break-up of the Soviet Union, several ex-republics began accepting Soviet military personnel in their forces if they would take a loyalty oath. The case in point is Ukraine. It is enlightening to note that many more have taken the oath than represent the ethnic Ukrainians in the Soviet military. The Commonwealth of Independent States Commander-in-Chief Shaposhnikov told Izvestia that as of January 3, 1992, 75 percent of the officers in Ukraine were ethnic Russians. However, the

¹⁰⁰"On Compliance with the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'On Preparation of Young People of Preinduction and Induction Age for Active Military Service in the USSR Armed Forces' (CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Resolution, 23 March 1990)," Izvestia TsK KPSS, No. 4 (4 Apr 90), 7-10, translated in "Monitoring Central Committee Resolutions," JPRS-UMA-90-012-L (29 Oct 90), 34.

¹⁰¹*ibid.*

¹⁰²Kuebart, 108.

Ukrainians have reported that 3,200 officers have taken the oath, and only 850 refused and were returned to Russia.¹⁰³ Many factors of course affect their choice, including the possibility of unemployment in a devastated economy. However, other members of the Commonwealth are beginning similar processes, apparently confident that they will attract enough officers for their military forces.¹⁰⁴

The next second indicator is the draft response. This indicator reflects a lagging change in attitudes, because there are still laws with a threat of prosecution mandating service. However, in spite of this, there were increasing numbers of draft dodgers and deserters. In 1989, some 7500 youths resisted conscription according to official figures. Other reports, however, put this figure at 5,000 for Lithuania alone.¹⁰⁵ A sample poll of young people in Moscow resulted in a third of the respondents saying they did not see a need for military service.¹⁰⁶ In a poll of inductees' parents taken in 1990 in the Georgian, Tajik, and Uzbek SSRs, and in Voronezh, Grodno, and Transcarpathian oblasts, over 20 percent did not want their sons to serve in the army. In Georgia, one-third of the

¹⁰³Stephen Foye and Douglas L. Clarke, ed., "Military and Security Notes," Radio Liberty Research Report.

¹⁰⁴Scott, H.F., "The 16th Republic," Air Force Times (February 1992): 36.

¹⁰⁵William Odom, "Soviet Military in Transition," Problems of Communism (May-Jun 1990), quoted from RFE-RL Daily Report 35 (19 Feb 90) and 243 (22 Dec 89).

¹⁰⁶Semyanovskiy, 29.

young people expressed an "unwillingness to serve."¹⁰⁷ However, other factors also affect draft responses. A major one is that many fear harsh treatment, injury or even death at the hands of older servicemen in the current military system.

The third indicator of the failure of the military-indoctrination program was the training status of the inductees when they reported. Theoretically, a successful indoctrination program would produce communities that ensured their young men were prepared for military service. However, that was frequently not the case, strongly implying that preparing the youth for military service was not high on their priority list. A Central Committee Secretariat resolution on the implementation of the 1986 law noted that 45 percent of young men being inducted into the Armed Forces in 1990 could not "fulfill the standard GTO series of exercises, shoot poorly and cannot swim."¹⁰⁸ The statistics were even worse from rural areas, where they did not have the resources to do the training, even if they had been so inclined.

With these indications of the lack of success, if not outright failure, of vospitanie in accomplishing its goal of military-patriotic education, is it reasonable

¹⁰⁷Col Res F. Semyanovskiy, "Conscript from Moscow. How He Is Prepared for Military Service," Krasnaya Zvezda (29 Apr 89): 2, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-012, "Moscow Area Given Low Marks for Pre-Draft Training," (22 May 89): 29.

¹⁰⁸"On Compliance With the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers Decree 'On Preparation of Young People of Preinduction and Induction Age for Active Military Service in the USSR Armed Forces' (CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Resolution, 23 March 1990)," Izvestia TsK KPSS, No. 4 (4 Apr 90), 7-10, translated in "Monitoring Central Committee Resolutions," JPRS-UMA-90-012-L (29 Oct 90), 34.

to assume any impact on future interactions with the former Soviets? Perhaps not. For all the years of rhetoric against the capitalist West, the former republics are racing to develop friendships with western powers. They have applied to NATO, and ten republics have joined the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.¹⁰⁹ U.S. officers seen in uniform in Russia are mobbed by people wanting autographs and treated as heroes. Provide Hope missions are welcomed by cheering crowds in St. Petersburg.¹¹⁰ However, there is a pocket of resistance to the change: in spite of the fact that their political leaders have said they have no enemies, the military officers still reportedly see the United States and NATO as "potential military adversaries."¹¹¹

D. LABOR/ECONOMIC EDUCATION

The effects of labor and economic education are more likely to be felt in internal issues than in international affairs. However, their need for foreign aid has made these effects an issue for the western world's consideration as well. The socialization of children toward work in a collective and against the evils of capitalism will undoubtedly be felt for years to come. These effects can already

¹⁰⁹Thomas L. Freidman, "10 Ex-Soviet Republics Gain Wider Recognition," The New York Times, 31 January 92, A6. Georgia, involved in internal strife, was left out.

¹¹⁰Col. John Piazza, "Provide Hope 'a mission of a lifetime'", Air Force Times (April 20, 1992): 13.

¹¹¹Doug Clarke, "Union of Officers Sees US/NATO Threat," Radio Liberty Daily Report, (16 Mar 92).

be seen in the slow pace of economic reform, and the reluctance of many to go solo in business or agriculture, much less industry. Polls in 1989 showed that the ideas of price decontrols, worker-owned factories, and private property were growing, but very slowly. They are up against "a deeply ingrained feeling of dependency on the central government and a powerful distaste for letting some get richer than others." In the poll, 47 percent said the state should set firm prices for all goods, no matter who produced them. Forty percent wanted the return of a "strong hand" of the state and another twenty percent wanted the "government to keep everyone at roughly an equal level."¹¹²

In 1991, the Soviet people were by no means completely free from the effects of vospitanie. Months after the demise of the Communist Party, the Russian Congress "balked at changing an article that would have allowed private ownership of land." This was after three days of intense politics that came close to reversing Yeltsin's economic reforms.¹¹³ Similar attitudes can be seen in the congresses of other ex-Soviet republics as well. In Kazakhstan, the Parliament is described as being caught in "old Soviet incantations about the Motherland" and

¹¹²Bill Keller, "Soviet Poll Finds Deep Pessimism Over Gorbachev's Economic Plan," The New York Times, 5 November 1989, A1. The poll was conducted by the National Public Opinion Research Center for the chairman of the State Committee on Economic Reform, Leonid I. Abalkin, and based on personal interviews of 1,148 Soviets in 16 large and small cities in September and October 1989.

¹¹³Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Gives Parliament a Scolding," The New York Times, 22 April 92, A6.

"balking at the truly private farm ownership". However, there, as elsewhere, the people have realized that they could lose their jobs when industries privatize, introducing a reluctance to leave communist economics that goes considerably beyond communist socialization.¹¹⁴ This attitude, however, is likely to be strongest in the weakest areas of the economy: those without the skills, education or energy to adapt to a competitive market economy and those of retirement or near-retirement age who will not have an opportunity to succeed in a new system.¹¹⁵ All of these people will be able to vote and, being unemployed, will have a lot of time to vocalize their displeasure with the new system. If this group opposing market reforms becomes more numerous or visible than those supporting Boris Yeltsin, foreign aid will be affected, which in turn will affect diplomatic relations with western countries limiting aid.

There is also another economic issue that will impact their international relations. That is the people's reaction to foreign investment. A survey conducted recently showed that 40 percent of the people "expressed fear that their government was yielding control of the economy to foreign investors." It is interesting to note that this resistance is strongest in industries associated with

¹¹⁴Francis X. Clines, "Kazakhs Seek a Level Capitalist Road," The New York Times, 27 January 92, A5.

¹¹⁵Carla Thorson, "Unemployment Growing in Russia," Radio Liberty Daily Report (Dec 20, 1991).

natural resources, such as oil and gas.¹¹⁶ This could be the result of several factors: political socialization against capitalist systems, dire economic conditions, and disastrous environmental leftovers from Communism.

E. SUMMARY

Only the passage of time will reveal the whole truth behind the political socialization of youth in the Soviet Union. Some elements obviously did not achieve complete success. The rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the increasing draft resistance of the past five years, seriously questions the effectiveness of the military-patriotic education. The rush to independence for the ex-Soviet republics and the subsequent nationalistic fervor pervading the region dispels the significance of their internationalist training. The slow change of the economy in the bulk of these nations reflects more a lack of information and fear of the unknown than confidence in the communist system.

¹¹⁶Bruce Weber, "Many in Former Soviet Lands Say They Feel Even More Insecure Now," The New York Times, 23 April 92, A3.

VIII. CONCLUSION

This is, of course, by no means an all-inclusive description of the indoctrination efforts that were at work in the Soviet Union. There were probably as many indoctrination techniques as there were people in the Communist Party. Also, the methods described here did not necessarily apply to every young Soviet. Differences were based on resources and priorities, and thus the "universal" program fell far short of its billing. However, political socialization was definitely a priority at some level. For instance, some type of preinduction training and military-patriotic education certainly were part of everyone's life. As seen above, the success of this program is questionable. Obviously, they did not develop Soviet patriotism and a desire to defend the socialist motherland in all young people. The eruption of independence-seeking nations throughout even the ex-Soviet republics indicates that they did not achieve internationalism. Apparently, they did not even achieve enough success for these issues to overcome the economic and social realities of life in recent times.

Why this lack of success in vospitanie? There are undoubtedly as many reasons as there are people involved. Reports from DOSAAF organizations show that interest in military training has dropped considerably. While the numbers of participants often look good on paper, it was usually the same youth who

participated in everything, not all youth participating in at least something.¹¹⁷ The youth groups faced similar problems. While children eagerly joined the Octobrists, interest dropped off drastically for the Komsomol. There was apparently a cut-off point about the age of fifteen, after which the majority of youth were no longer significantly swayed by the youth groups.¹¹⁸

Another factor was the idealism of the youth; "they tended to expect more from the leadership because, at that time, they still firmly believed in socialism."¹¹⁹ However, they were soon disillusioned. They became aware of the hypocrisy of adult society, and the existence of a facade that was very different from reality. As one dissident put it "The ideology I was taught in school and the life I knew were in glaring contradiction."¹²⁰ This contradiction, and the hypocrisy with which the authorities faced it, soon undermined and repudiated years of vospitanie.

Glasnost had a significant effect as well. As society became more open about life in general, and abuses by the Communist Party in particular, the

¹¹⁷I. Chikomasova, "At a Crawl: Progress of the Kursk Industrial Rayon Committee of DOSAAF," Voyennyye Znaniya, No. 2 (Feb 89), 10-11, translated in JPRS-UMA-89-014 (3 Jun 89), 49.

¹¹⁸Jim Riordan, "The Komsomol," in Soviet Youth Culture, Jim Riordan, ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 37.

¹¹⁹Tanya Frisby, "Soviet Youth Culture," in Soviet Youth Culture, Jim Riordan, ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1989), 2.

¹²⁰Leonid Plyushch, History's Carnival: A Dissident's Autobiography, trans. Marco Carynnyk (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977), 9.

propaganda had increasingly less effect. A similar circumstance was seen with World War II, when the soldiers exposed to the West saw life under capitalism to be different from the way the Communist Party described it. With increasing accessibility to foreign media, the Soviet public was less and less dependent on government news sources. Glasnost added to this the possibility of the widespread exchange of information among Soviets without the effect of government censorship. People soon realized that problems they thought were unique to their small area were in fact plaguing people throughout the country. The more this happened, the more people began to blame the communist system for breeding corruption, in addition to the corrupt officials with whom they had to deal. After years of tolerating small lies, the people were suddenly awakened to the fact that they were huge lies, especially about Stalin, spread right from the very start. People rapidly became disillusioned with their government and the Communist Party.

This does not mean, however, that the years of growing up under communism did not socialize the people. The inertia is tremendous. A country the size of Russia will take years, possibly even generations, to complete the change to democracy, and their communist upbringing can only make this more difficult. However, this research suggests that this background affected the ex-Soviets more by denying them other information than by convincing them that the communist information was correct. The complete lack of knowledge on market economies, private enterprise, and democratic procedures is only the

beginning. In this case, Boris Yeltsin is a prime example: he has "repeatedly demonstrated that however strong his devotion to democracy or private enterprise, his understanding of them is shaky."¹²¹

¹²¹Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin's Ambiguity Persists: Democrat Who Rules By Fiat," The New York Times (31 January 92), A1.

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